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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we outline an approach for the generation of guided 
weapon safety templates via probabilistic means. This approach 
involves the calculation of a ground impact distribution database for 
each weapon via Monte Carlo simulations performed on a ‘farm’ of 
computers. A safety template specific to a user-defined firing envelope 
is then generated. The template is a probability density function of the 
ground impacts for the specified firing parameters. We are currently 
building a two-part system to provide this capability to the Australian 
Department of Defence for weapon test and evaluation purposes. The 
first part is a data preparation process that weapon experts can use to 
produce the weapon-specific ground impact distribution databases. The 
second part of the system is a software tool intended for operational 
users and range managers. This tool references the weapon database 
to generate a safety template for a specific firing envelope. We intend 
that the system be accepted for general use by the Department of 
Defence; hence, we are building it in accordance with departmental 
quality assurance requirements for complex aerospace systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A range safety template is an important method for the assessment of risk associated with 
weapon launches.  The template can take a number of forms, including: 
• A curve representing an area where the weapon might land with a specific 
probability 
• A contour plot representing different regions of ground impact probabilities.    
These plots are overlayed on maps of the intended launch area and used to assess if 
there is a high risk of the launch affecting the safety of people and/or equipment.  The 
results of the risk assessment can lead to the conditions of the launch being changed.  
For example, if the curve representing an impact area with a probability of 1×10-6 lies 
outside the firing range boundary the launch might be planned for a lower altitude or a 
different location. 
Various organisations within the Australian Department of Defence have produced and 
used range safety templates over many years. However, there is no broadly-accepted 
methodology to generate the templates. Each weapon has been dealt with on an ad hoc 
basis by the organisation with responsibility for developing and/or authorising templates 
for that particular weapon. In response, DSTO’s Weapons Systems Division has proposed 
a generic Range Safety Template Toolkit (RSTT). 
The initial RSTT will be a functional prototype designed both to generate safety templates 
for the ASRAAM air-to-air missile within a limited firing envelope, and to serve as a risk 
reduction exercise for the full RSTT, which will be capable of broad use. 
Our main justifications for development of the ‘full’ Range Safety Template Toolkit are as 
follows:  
• A need exists to generate probabilistic range safety templates for ASRAAM. 
• The current approach to template development and approval is ad hoc; there is no 
‘system’ as such. 
• There is not adequate support for longer-range weapons, particularly for future 
ground-based air defence and, possibly, ballistic missile defence applications.  
The information used to generate templates supplied with weapon systems purchased 
from foreign countries may be partially or completely restricted. This can hinder the 
certification of the templates for use by the Australian Department of Defence. In addition, 
we can rarely modify the supplied template for Australia’s needs. If limited data is 
available on a particular weapon the local generation of a safety template might not be 
possible. In this situation the Australian Department of Defence can prescribe the 
methodologies of the RSTT as the required standard. This will ensure that all 
Departmental legal and technical requirements are met by the organisation supplying the 
weapon and safety template. One of the elements of the RSTT will therefore be a data 
item description for use with the Australian Department of Defence’s standard acquisition 
contracting template. A weapon manufacturer will be required to: 
• Enable the Australian Department of Defence to generate a template from raw 
data about the weapon, or 
• Provide the complete (or large elements of) the weapon database to link directly 
with the mature RSTT front end.  
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2. RANGE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
We derived a number of RSTT requirements by canvassing all elements of Defence with 
potential interest in range safety. The following sections summarize the requirements of 
the evolving RSTT. (Aerospace Concepts 2005a)   
2.1 Air Weapon Types   
The RSTT must provide safety templates and associated outputs for ‘legacy’ air weapons, 
weapons under procurement and future air weapon developments/acquisitions.  
The RSTT could also be used for unguided weapons, such as iron bombs, if necessary 
since an unguided weapon is analogous to a guided weapon. 
Additionally, the RSTT could support foreign and commercial use of the AOSG-managed 
Woomera range.  The processes and techniques developed for the RSTT will potentially 
meet the requirements of a number of aerodyne systems and commercial applications.  
Space vehicle launch and re-entry are examples that could take advantage of the RSTT 
with minimal changes. 
2.2 Weapon Lifecycle   
The RSTT must support the testing of air weapons in all stages of the lifecycle from 
experimental/conceptual development through to in-service exercises and to life-of-type 
extension validation. 
2.3 Users and Usage  
The following are potential users of, and uses for, the RSTT: 
• Operational staff (aircrew and ship’s crew) to support trials planning and other 
operationally-focused activities. 
• Technical staff to support analysis, flight trials, and the development of operating 
procedures and similar. 
• Capability development staff to support development of capability requirements; 
for example, whether or not a given weapon needs a flight termination system 
based on likely operating areas. 
2.4 Useability   
All identified classes of user must be able to use the RSTT. Furthermore, the information 
generated by the RSTT should be easily understandable by operational and technical staff 
and relevant outside parties; for example, legal advisers and public officials. 
The RSTT must provide ‘quick look’ results to aid rapid assessment of options for 
operational planning and also provide more detailed results to support technical 
assessments and similar activities. 
The range safety software must be useable in standard computing environments likely to 
be found in Australian Defence agencies. 
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2.5 Policy   
The RSTT must conform to applicable Australian Department of Defence policy. 
The list of policy documents (and their impact on the Range Safety Template Toolkit) must 
continue to be updated throughout the project to ensure that policy requirements have 
been properly captured. 
2.6 Economy   
The Range Safety Template Toolkit should only demand as much user input, and 
consume as much computational resource, as is necessary to satisfy the particular safety 
template generation requirement being addressed. For example, one of the most obvious 
and conservative ways to obtain a safety template is to compute the Maximum Energy 
Boundary (MEB), which is the theoretical maximum distance a missile can fly after launch. 
Hence, the first step in using the RSTT process should be the calculation of an MEB:  
• If the MEB falls within the range boundary (assuming that a bounded range is the 
firing location in all directions), then no further assessment is necessary.  
• If, however, the MEB falls outside the range boundary, then a probabilistic 
approach should be employed to calculate a smaller range boundary that is within 
specified safety limits. 
2.7 Confidence   
The RSTT must be able to produce safety templates and associated outputs in which 
there is a sufficient degree of confidence to support safety-of-life safety case decisions 
defensible in a court of law.  
This need assumes, of course, that there is sufficient information about a given weapon 
and employment scenario with which to calculate high-confidence safety templates and 
associated outputs. 
Consequently, the RSTT must be able to provide some indication of the level of 
confidence in calculated safety templates and associated outputs as a function of quality 
or completeness of inputted information. 
2.8 Assurance  
The apparent need for a ‘legal standard’ of confidence in the results implies that the RSTT 
may need to meet yet-to-be-specified assurance requirements to ensure that the: 
• Mathematical theory upon which the range safety templates are generated is valid 
(correct design), 
• Implementation of this mathematical theory into processes and software is correct 
(correct build), 
• Generated weapon data-set accurately represents weapon behaviour (correct 
model), 
• Correct weapon data set is used to generate templates (correct weapon), and 
• Scenario/engagement envelope selection is correct (correct scenario). 
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These assurance requirements may, in turn, affect the RSTT development process by, for 
example, demanding that development be done in accordance with a particular software 
development standard or that specific verification and validation techniques be employed. 
Service-specific assurance regimes also need to be accommodated. 
2.9 Robustness   
A full set of template-related weapon information is not always available. This is because 
of the varied nature of the weapons to be supported by the RSTT and the need to support 
testing of air weapons in all stages of the lifecycle: 
• In-service weapons. Obtaining template-related information for in service 
weapons is often problematic. The reason for this is that a major motivation for 
supplying detailed technical information (the promise of a major acquisition 
contract) is lacking and there may be no residual contractual right to the required 
information. 
• To-be-acquired weapons. Template-related information for to-be-acquired 
weapons is usually obtained from the Original Equipment Manufacturer via the 
contracting process. This means that there is a reasonable likelihood that sufficient 
template-related data can be obtained as necessary. 
• Experimental and developmental weapons. For those that are not mature 
enough to have undergone detailed engineering analysis, such as FMECA, 
template-related information may not exist. 
Consequently, the RSTT must be able to calculate safety templates in the absence of full 
weapon technical information, albeit with a potentially-degraded level of confidence in the 
templates and associated outputs. 
2.10 Traceability   
The RSTT should provide insight into the effect of air weapon failure modes, or design 
features, on range safety; for example: 
• ‘The reason the maximum energy bubble transgresses a particular range 
boundary is due to a guidance system failure at 10 seconds into the flight.’ 
• ‘The reason that debris lands within 500m of the road is that the weapon was at 
1500ft when an engine failure occurred 15 seconds after launch.’ 
The RSTT tool should, as far as is practicable, provide traceability right from initial failure 
modes and flight paths through to effects on the ground. 
2.11 Geographical Situation   
The RSTT must be useable for activities contained entirely within land and sea test 
ranges and, for those weapons that demand it, for activities conducted beyond 
established range boundaries. 
In all cases, the RSTT must take account of the placement of roads, range boundaries, 
buildings, technical equipment and other nominated places and objects. Example 
constraints that the RSTT must be able to accommodate might be as follows: 
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• ‘The maximum energy bubble shall not be within 500m of the range boundary.’ 
• ‘The probability of any debris impacting within 500m of any road or railway shall be 
less than 10-5.’ 
• ‘The maximum individual risk to any member of the general public shall be less 
than 10-7.’ 
The Range Safety Template Toolkit must be flexible enough to accommodate range 
safety requirements arising during use rather than prescribing them all during RSTT 
development. 
Finally, consideration should be given to having the RSTT produce three-dimensional 
templates as an aid to airspace management. 
3. THE FUNCTIONAL PROTOTYPE 
3.1 System Concept 
Our Range Safety Template Toolkit consists of two sub-systems linked by an impact 
distribution/maximum energy database as shown in Figure 1. 
The data preparation sub-system is used by subject matter experts to produce the 
weapon-specific impact distribution/maximum energy databases. We prepare data 
through simulations, weapon-specific information and statistical analysis. Both maximum 
energy and probabilistic methodologies will be supported. 
The template generation sub-system is a user-friendly software tool that produces a 
template from a user’s flight envelope selections. We plan to create the templates through 
careful application of selection, mixing and plotting algorithms to the impact 
distribution/maximum energy databases. The front-end tool will be integrated with a 
Geospatial Information System (GIS) to allow the templates to be compared with range 
boundaries, allow for calculation of expected casualty estimates and so on. 
3.2 Probabilistic Templates 
Probabilistic template generation for the RSTT is more resource and-time intensive than 
calculating a Maximum Energy Boundary. Therefore, we have identified it as the highest 
technical risk to the RSTT project. Although full development of the probabilistic 
methodology is not complete, we have established most of the elements.  While we focus 
on probabilistic templates in this paper, the MEB is an important element of the RSTT.  
The MEB is found by simulating the optimal flight of the guided weapon to achieve 
maximum ground impact distance. 
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Figure 1:  Schematic of the Range Safety Template Toolkit.  
Our process begins with failure analysis, including, but not limited to, a Failure Mode 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), of the weapon system of interest. The failure 
analysis provides information about potential failures, their likelihood and effects, and a 
measure of how critical the failure is to system operation. This information is gathered by 
the manufacturer from rigorous testing of the missile systems in accordance with industry 
standards.  Certain individual failures often result in the same system behaviour. The 
behaviour of such a group of failures is referred to as a Failure Response Mode (FRM). 
For example, failures in the actuator frame components, or the power supply, or the PCB 
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assembly can all cause the fins to drive to their endstops.  This is a case of three failure 
modes giving rise to one FRM.  Figure 2 shows some potential FRMs.  Systematic 
failures, such as software and guidance failures, are included if they can be accurately 
described and assigned probabilities of occurrence.  If failures of this type cannot be 
quantified, the MEB must be considered.   
Failure
Response
Modes
Loss of
tracking
Warhead
detonation
delayed
Random fin
movements
No warhead
detonation
Abnormal
ignition
Short thrust
rise time
Asymmetric
thrust
Reduced
thrust
Premature
thrust
termination
Long thrust
rise time
Break-up
failure
Missile
break-up
All fins
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1 fin
oscillates
All fins
driven to
endstop
1 fin driven
to endstop
Actuator
voltage
variation
Fin position
error
Abnormal
thrust/time
history
Low thrust
 
Figure 2: Possible Failure Response Modes for guided weapons. 
We use a medium fidelity Six-Degree-of-Freedom (6DOF) model of the weapon system, 
which includes models of the FRMs, to generate ground-impact distributions. For specified 
launch/release conditions and particular target profiles we do Monte Carlo simulations to 
determine where the weapon might land for each potential FRM occurring at a random 
time of flight. Sufficient information is recorded so that the simulation associated with each 
ground impact location can be recreated and viewed for a detailed inspection of the 
weapon’s behaviour.  This functionality has been included to address the traceability 
requirement outlined in section 2.10.  An example of a ground impact distribution is 
presented in Figure 3, which represents a total of 50000 simulation runs. The impact 
locations correspond to a fictitious guided weapon and a single set of initial launcher and 
target conditions. In this example, we have allowed the fins to lock to zero degree 
deflection at a random time during the missile’s flight. The trajectories for a successful 
target engagement are also shown. We use a computer farm to complete the Monte Carlo 
simulations in a reasonable time.   
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Figure 3:  50000 ground-impact locations for a fictitious guided weapon with fins 
locking to zero degree deflection at random times. 
 
We have selected a Kernel Density Estimation technique (Silverman 1982, 1986) to 
create a smooth two-dimensional Probability Density Function (PDF) for each 
scenario/failure combination. Figure 4 shows an example PDF derived from the scenario 
represented in Figure 3.  
Combining the PDFs for each FRM, given the probability of occurrence extracted from the 
failure analysis, is quite straightforward. The problem is that this produces a template valid 
only for a point in the operational envelope of the weapon. In an air-to-air engagement for 
example, even a test pilot would be hard pressed to take the shot when travelling at 
exactly 210 knots with the target exactly 5.3 nautical miles away. So the final template 
must be valid for a user-selected region of the envelope. We achieve this by establishing 
the PDFs at the corners and other critical points of the envelope, and then using 
conservative interpolation techniques to cover the variable space.  
We produce the final template by setting the probability-density-of-impact for any grid-
square on the ground to be the maximum probability density at the corresponding grid 
squares of all the overlayed PDFs. This produces a conservative ground impact 
probability map that is valid for a shot taken anywhere in the user-selected envelope. We 
turn the probability map into a safety template (or footprint) by drawing the appropriate 
contour or risk isopleth for the acceptable risk threshold. The ground impact probability 
map can also be used with population demographics to calculate an expected casualty 
estimate. 
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Figure 4:  Probability Density Function (log10 scale) for a fictitious guided weapon 
with fins locking to zero degree deflection at random times. 
We have yet to determine the appropriate balance between how much of the analysis and 
calculation should be performed in the data preparation system or on-demand in the end-
user software tool. 
3.3 Implementation Considerations 
We currently envisage the RSTT as a stand alone system that will not be integrated with 
other hardware and/or software systems. There will not be any direct ‘feeds’ into or out of 
weapon computers or mission planning systems. The RSTT front-end software is 
expected to run on standard Defence computing infrastructure. 
Our RSTT requires data from a number of sources/agencies external to the RSTT system. 
These include: 
• Meteorological data 
o Required for trial planning 
o Must only be from authorised sources (e.g. Bureau of Meteorology) 
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• Air-weapon technical data 
o Required for template generation 
o Must be certified by weapon manufacturers 
• Trial scenario data 
o Required for trial planning 
o Must be authorised by operations unit commanders 
• Geospatial data 
o Required for trial planning 
o Must be authorised by range authorities 
4. RANGE SAFETY ASSURANCE 
A major issue in providing advice to the acceptance authority (who will authorise the 
system’s output for operational use) is ensuring that all facets of the RSTT system are 
correct. For example, if the process by which the template is generated is flawed (i.e. the 
input data is incorrect, the software malfunctions or the user misinterprets the output) then 
safety will likely be compromised.  
In reviewing Defence’s guidance on the authorisation of range safety templates, we found 
AOSG’s Standing Instruction (Operations) 4-34 – Authorisation Of Weapon Safety 
Templates (Aerospace Operational Support Group) most useful. This instruction directs 
that the process of review of weapon safety templates be based on the Air Force design 
acceptance process defined in Australian Air Publication 7001.053 – Technical 
Airworthiness Management Manual (Australian Defence Force 2005): 
• Specification of requirement. Ensure the definition of the launch conditions and 
the requirements of the Weapon Safety Template are complete and acceptable. 
• Determination of competence. Verify the competence of the organisation 
developing the Weapon Safety Template. 
• Verification of requirement satisfaction. Verify that the Weapon Safety 
Template is acceptable to the Commonwealth. 
• Certification of requirement satisfaction. Certification by the organisation that 
the Weapon Safety Template satisfies the requirements of the launch conditions. 
Using the current framework, a network of personnel from a variety of Defence areas will 
be used to develop and review the template generating tools. For the functional prototype, 
Table 1 provides an overview of the personnel selected (and their role) in the RSTT 
development. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a robust, comprehensive and flexible Range Safety Template Toolkit 
capable of meeting the diverse requirements of guided weapon safety template 
generation. Our data preparation process and front-end software tool will be capable of 
providing templates containing both Maximum Energy Boundary and ground-impact 
probability information. Range safety will be addressed with the appropriate level of 
assurance through weapon manufacturers and/or defence organisations adopting the 
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processes and methodologies of the proposed system. For the Australian Department of 
Defence, the Range Safety Template Toolkit will be a valuable asset for the assessment 
and safe testing of existing and future weapon systems. 
Table 1: Development assurance roles. (Aerospace Concepts 2005b) 
Role Position Role Description 
Senior Design 
Authority 
Senior Scientist within 
Weapons Systems Division 
of DSTO 
Provides the ‘experts’ required to develop the 
concepts and methodology to derive a 
probabilistic template  
Review 
Manager 
Contracted Support  Provides independent review of the concept 
and method by which the design organisation 
creates the RSTT. 
Technical 
Approval 
Authority 
AOSG Senior Engineer Ensures that technical requirements are met, 
such as assessing the appropriateness of the 
engineering framework within which the system 
will be developed, the standards used are 
appropriate, the required processes are 
adhered to, etc. 
Operational 
Approval 
Authority 
Representative of the 
Force Element Group 
Commander who will be a 
user of the  template 
Ensures that the RSTT development is 
undertaken in accordance with operational 
airworthiness guidance and requirements. 
Acceptance 
Authority 
Air Commander, 
Headquarters Air 
Command  
Accepts the RSTT for operational use. 
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